SCRUTINIZING LEGACY ADMISSIONS: APPLYING TIERS OF SCRUTINY
TO LEGACY PREFERENCE POLICIES IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
T. Liam Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
Children of alumni, or legacy applicants, are as much as five times more
likely to be admitted into prestigious universities than non-legacy applicants.1
Legacy applicants receive an admissions advantage at 85% of the 150 most
prestigious universities in the United States.2 These policies differ by
university, but at the highest-ranked universities, legacy applicants receive a
45% admissions advantage over non-legacy applicants.3
This is a problem because legacy advantage policies decrease diversity
and deny equality of opportunity. In contrast to race-based advantage
policies, the beneficiaries of legacy advantage policies are disproportionately
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See Delano R. Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel, Legacy Admit Rate Five Times That of Non-Legacies, Court
Docs Show, HARV. CRIMSON, June 20, 2018, https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/
6/20/admissions-docs-legacy/ (“The admission rate of legacy applicants is over five times that of
non-legacy students . . . . ”).
See Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara L. Alpern, No Distinctions Except Those Which Merit
Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 51, 129 (2009) (“Of [] 150 [top] schools, we were able to confirm that 102 grant legacy
preferences . . . .”); Keith Powers, Legacy Admissions and Basic Fairness: The Wrong Way to Boost Students’
College Admissions Chances, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydaily
news.com/opinion/ny-oped-legacy-admissions-vs-fairness-20180904-story.html (“Roughly 75%
of the country’s top 100 universities in the U.S. News and World Report use legacy preference
when admitting students, as do nearly all of the top 100 liberal arts schools.”).
See Yoni Blumberg, Harvard’s Incoming Freshman Class Is One-Third Legacy—Here’s Why That’s a Problem,
CNBC (Sept. 6, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/06/harvards-incoming-classis-one-third-legacy.html (noting that at the top thirty universities, legacy applicants receive a 45%
advantage in admissions chances over non-legacy applicants).
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wealthy and white.4 These demographics are already over-represented at
prestigious universities,5 where students from families in the top 1% of wealth
outnumber students from the entire bottom 60% of wealth.6
Legacy advantage policies deny equality of opportunity by delegitimizing
universities as a vehicle for social and economic mobility.7 Equal access to
higher education plays a vital role in sustaining the legitimacy of equality of
opportunity.8 Legacy advantage policies deter the advancement of children
from low-income, low-education families, while simultaneously granting a
benefit to children from high-income, high-education families.9 Until
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See id. (“Legacy students tend to be wealthy and white, students who, as a group, are already
disproportionately represented at college.”).
Id.; Daniella Silva, Study on Harvard Finds 43 Percent of White Students are Legacy, Athletes, Related to Donors
or Staff, NBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/studyharvard-finds-43-percent-white-students-are-legacy-athletes-n1060361.
See Yoni Blumberg, Harvard’s Incoming Freshman Class Is One-Third Legacy—Here’s Why That’s a Problem,
CNBC (Sept. 6, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/06/harvards-incoming-classis-one-third-legacy.html (“The New York Times found that, at five Ivy League schools, Dartmouth,
Princeton, Yale, Penn and Brown, as well as 33 other colleges, there are more students from families
in the top one percent than from the entire bottom 60 percent.”).
See Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College
Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCES 101, 117 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004)
(“Higher education is the ‘great equalizer’ and must promote social and economic mobility.”).
See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 276 (1998)
(admission to elite universities “is an exceedingly valuable resource-valuable both to the students
admitted and to the society at large-which is why admissions need to be based ‘on the merits”);
PETER SACKS, TEARING DOWN THE GATES: CONFRONTING THE CLASS DIVIDE IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 122 (2007) (“[Flor any nation that purports to uphold egalitarian and democratic
values, it matters who is educated at these [elite] institutions.”). See generally John K. Wilson, The
Myth of Reverse Discrimination in Higher Education, 10 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 88, 93 (1995–96)
(“[E]lite degrees are part of an intricate certification process that gives their recipients a huge
advantage in the job market and a network of alums to help them.”).
One study found that more than 5,000 high schools nationwide had students that graduated with
qualifications sufficient for admission to Harvard but did not have a single student apply there.
Further, “[m]any of these 5,000 high schools with highly qualified students have a limited history
of sending graduates to Harvard, and most have large numbers of economically disadvantaged
students.” Large Numbers of Highly Qualified, Low-Income Students Are Not Applying to Harvard and Other
Highly Selective Schools, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (2006), www.jbhe.com/news_views/52_lowincome-students.html (explaining the results of a study that found academically strong students
from low-income families are reluctant to apply to prestigious colleges like Harvard).
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universities “re-examine their legacy policies and make substantive changes,
diversity on a large scale will continue to be hindered.”10
Recently, legacy advantage polices have received headlines resulting
from a high-profile affirmative action case, Students for Fair Admissions v.
Harvard.11 The legal question of this lawsuit was whether Harvard unlawfully
discriminated against Asian-Americans in undergraduate admissions.12
Richard Kahlenberg, author of the seminal book on legacy admissions,
Affirmative Action for the Rich,13 testified for the Plaintiffs.14 Kahlenberg claimed
that “socioeconomic diversity at Harvard is deeply lacking,” asserting that
“there are up to 23 times as many rich students at Harvard as poor ones.”15
The complaint alleged that legacy advantages “operate to the disadvantage
of minority applicants.”16 The Harvard case was successful at highlighting
the unfairness of legacy admissions. However, the legal claims are limited to
Harvard’s race-based preference policies and does not implicate legacy
admissions.17
Unlike race-based preference policies, the constitutionality of legacy
preferences in university admissions has never been addressed by the
Supreme Court. But this may change. Author of the Sixth Circuit’s
landmark affirmative action opinion Grutter v. Bollinger,18 Judge Boyce Martin,
Jr., recently said that “legacy admissions are problematic legally,” and that
he “expect[s] legal challenges to the practice of legacy preferences, especially
10
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Marybeth Gasman & Julie Vultaggio, Perspectives: A “Legacy” of Racial Injustice in American Higher
Education, DIVERSE ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 22, 2008, https://diverseeducation.com/
article/10519/.
Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, No. 1:14-cv-14176-DJC (D. Mass. filed Nov. 17, 2014).
See Janelle Lawrence & Patricia Hurtado, Your Kid’s Legacy Admission May Be One Casualty of Harvard
Trial, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201810-23/one-casualty-of-harvard-trial-may-be-your-kid-s-legacy-admission (discussing a lawsuit
against Harvard that alleges that the college discriminates against Asian-Americans during
undergraduate admissions).
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH, LEGACY
PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 201 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010).
Lawrence & Hurtado, supra note 12 (noting that Richard Kahlenberg testified for the plaintiff in
the lawsuit against Harvard which alleged that it discriminated against Asian-Americans during
undergraduate admissions).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Eric Hoover, Wait, Will Anyone Investigate Legacy Admissions?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 3, 2017,
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Wait-Will-Anyone-Investigate/240850.
See id. (explaining that Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard challenged “racial preferences,” not
“legacy preferences”).
288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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at public universities such as the University of Virginia, to begin in the near
future.”19
Judge Martin, Jr. and other legal scholars have assumed that a legal
challenge against legacy preference policies would arise under the Equal
Protection Clause.20 The Supreme Court’s precedent on race-based
preference policies makes clear that admissions decisions at public
universities are subject to the Equal Protection Clause.21 The Civil Rights
Act of 186622 extends this right to cover admissions decisions at private
universities.23 When the constitutionality of a law is challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause, courts will apply one of three levels of judicial
scrutiny.
This Comment analyzes legacy preference policies under the three levels
of judicial scrutiny: strict, intermediate, and rational-basis review. This
Comment does not take a stance on which level of scrutiny a judge would
apply when analyzing a challenge of a legacy preference policy. Rather, this
Comment takes an impartial stance on that question, and instead, explores
19
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RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 201.
See Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 52–53 (noting that legal commentators have
generally believed that legacy admissions schemes are not prohibited under the Equal Protection
Clause). Legal scholars have also argued that legacy preferences in public universities violate the
Constitution’s prohibition on granting titles of nobility. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of
Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1383 (2006) (arguing that legacy preference schemes violate the
Constitution’s Nobility Clauses).
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270, 275–76 (2003) (striking down undergraduate admissions
policy that gave an advantage to racial minorities solely because of race as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit the [University of Michigan] Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body.”).
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140). The portion of this Act that we are concerned with—the prohibition
on discrimination in the right “to make and enforce contracts”—is currently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2010).
The Supreme Court has held that, given their common origins and purposes, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and the Equal Protection Clause should be construed in harmony with respect to
discrimination based on race or ancestry. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948) (“[I]n many
significant respects the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] and the [Fourteenth] Amendment were
expressions of the same general congressional policy.”); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1892) (“In light of the close connection between [the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement Act of 1870] and the [Fourteenth] Amendment, it would
be incongruous to construe the principal object of their successor, § 1981, in a manner markedly
different from that of the Amendment itself.”).
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the strongest legal arguments for each standard of review applying to a case
challenging the constitutionality of a legacy preference policy.
I. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO LEGACY POLICIES
Policies frequently involve making classifications that either advantage or
disadvantage one group of persons, but not another. For example, states
allow twenty-year-olds to drive, but do not allow twelve-year-olds to.24
Impoverished “single parents receive government financial aid that is denied
to millionaires.”25 The Equal Protection Clause does not require policies to
treat all persons exactly the same.26 Rather, a governmental policy is only
obligated to treat people the same if they are similarly circumstanced.27
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has developed a three-tiered
approach to analyze whether a policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Policies that involve suspect classifications or classifications that burden
fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.28 Strict scrutiny applies to
cases of potential discrimination on the basis of suspect classifications like
race,29 national origin,30 and ancestry,31 and to cases that impair fundamental
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Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, EXPLORING CONST. CONFLICTS,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
The concept of “similarly situated” developed in doctrinal contexts other than equal protection and
then entered the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in 1884. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367–68 (1886) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause requires those
who are “similarly situated” not be treated differently for an arbitrary reason).
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.”).
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (explaining that racial classifications are subject
to “the most exacting scrutiny”).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that racial classifications are “subject
. . . to the most rigid scrutiny”), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2432 (2018).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) (noting
that the Court has given heightened scrutiny to ancestry classification); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1991) (implying that the use of “classifications based on
ancestry or skin color,” as they relate to the use of peremptory strikes in a civil suit, are
presumptively unlawful); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (“[A] State’s
distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens [cannot] hinge[] . . . on ancestry or the color of a
person’s skin . . . . ”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 & n.4 (1976) (citing Oyama
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rights.32 Under strict scrutiny, a policy will be sustained only if it involves a
compelling objective and the classification is necessary to serve that
objective.33
Legacy preference policies make classifications between people based on
whether an applicant’s parents attended that university. A judge deciding to
apply strict scrutiny to a legacy preference policy would likely face arguments
that two different suspect classifications applied. First, they could determine
that legacy preference policies discriminate against applicants based on
ancestry. Second, they could determine that these policies discriminate
against applicants based on race. This Part explores both suspect
classifications and identifies Supreme Court precedent that would be
instructive to a judge deciding whether to analyze legacy preference policies
under strict scrutiny.
A. The Ancestry Classification
1. Policies that discriminate on the basis of ancestry are subject to strict scrutiny
The Supreme Court has long held that discrimination on the basis of
“ancestry” is subject to strict scrutiny.34 This rule was first articulated over

32

33
34

v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) (noting that ancestry is a suspect classification); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972) (noting that “certain classifications based on unalterable traits such
as race and lineage are inherently suspect . . . . ”) (footnotes omitted); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 479 (1954) (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of
their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny to a policy that
discriminated on the basis of the fundamental right to vote); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1867) (applying strict scrutiny to a policy that discriminated on the basis of the fundamental
right to travel freely).
See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“In other words, [racial] classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”).
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 629 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) (noting that the Court
has given heightened scrutiny to ancestry classification); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630–31 (implying
that the use of “classifications based on ancestry or skin color,” as they relate to the use of
peremptory strikes in a civil suit, are presumptively unlawful); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (“[A] State’s
distribution of benefits or imposition of burden [cannot] hinge[] . . . on ancestry or the color of a
person’s skin . . . . ”); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 & n.4 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948)) (noting that ancestry is a suspect classification); Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73 (noting that “certain
classifications based on unalterable traits such as race and lineage are inherently suspect . . . . ”)
(footnotes omitted); Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479 (holding that discrimination based on ancestry or
national origin, as it relates to jury selection, is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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seventy-five years ago in Hirabayashi v. United States.35 The Court explained
that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.”36 The Court’s language in Hirabayashi has been
consistently quoted for the rule that a policy that discriminates on the basis
of ancestry is subject to strict scrutiny.37
A decade after Hirabayashi, the Court firmly articulated that
discrimination on the basis of ancestry is prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause.38 In Hernandez v. Texas, the Texas system for selecting jurors by the
use of jury commissions was found to be fair on its face but capable of being
utilized for discrimination.39 The plaintiff in Hernandez was a person of
Mexican descent, and he challenged his state conviction on the grounds that
persons of similar Mexican ancestry had been purposely discriminated against
in the selection of jurors in the county he was convicted.40 The Court held
that the exclusion of eligible jurors on the basis of their ancestry was
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.41 In doing so, the

35
36
37
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41

320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”).
Id.; see also id. at 110 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly
inconsistent with our traditions and ideals.”).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007)
(recognizing the holding established in Hirabayashi); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)
(quoting the language from Hirabayashi directly); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,
613 (1987) (“Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who
are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting the general rule that
discrimination based on ancestry has been “consistently repudiated”); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (recognizing the general rule that discrimination on the basis of ancestry is
“odious”).
See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479 (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely
because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
Id. at 478–79 (“[T]he Texas system of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury commissions
is fair on its face and capable of being utilized without discrimination. But as this Court has held,
the system is susceptible to abuse and can be employed in a discriminatory manner.”) (footnote
omitted).
Id. at 476–77 (“[Petitioner] alleged that persons of Mexican descent were systematically excluded
from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors, although there were such persons
fully qualified to serve residing in [the county where petitioner was convicted].”) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 479 (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of their
ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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Court cited Hirabayashi’s famous words and confirmed that strict scrutiny
applies to policies that discriminate on the basis of ancestry.42
The ancestry classification also applies to a case of private discrimination.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981,43 prohibits discrimination based on ancestry.44 In Runyon v. McCrary,
the Supreme Court held that the 1866 Act’s proscriptions apply to
admissions discrimination in both public and private schools.45 The Court
has also held that, given their common origins, the 1866 Act and the Equal
Protection Clause should be construed in harmony with respect to
discrimination based on race or ancestry.46
The Supreme Court has held that the 1866 Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of ancestry.47 In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court held
that an American born in Iraq could claim that he was unlawfully
42
43

44

45

46

47

Id. at 478 n.4 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140). The portion of this Act that we are concerned with—the prohibition
on discrimination in the right “to make and enforce contracts”—is currently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2010).
See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“Based on the history of § 1981,
we have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their
ancestry . . . . ”); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibits
racially discriminatory admissions procedures at private schools).
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176–77 (holding that the 1866 Act’s proscriptions apply to the admission
decisions of private schools); see also Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in
the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491
U.S. 701, 735 (1989) (acknowledging that the proscriptions set forth in the 1866 Act apply to state
actors by way of the Fourteenth Amendment); Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 (implying that the
proscriptions of the 1866 Act can apply to private schools by way of § 1981); see, e.g., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (concluding that a law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Doe v. Kamehameha
Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that
racial preferences in admissions criteria for private school did not violate § 1981).
See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S., 375, 389–90 (1982) (“In light of the
close connection between [the 1866 Act and the 1870 Act] and the Amendment, it would be
incongruous to construe the principal object of their successor, § 1981, in a manner markedly
different from that of the Amendment itself.”) (footnote omitted); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32
(1948) (“[I]n many significant respects the [1866 Act] and the Amendment were expressions of the
same general congressional policy.”).
Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613. In Al-Khazraji, plaintiff, a United States citizen born in Iraq, was a
professor who was denied tenure by defendant college. Id. at 606. He sued on the ground that the
denial of tenure was based on “national origin, religion, and/or race.” Id. The district court had
entered summary judgment against plaintiff on the ground that discrimination based on Arabian
ancestry is not “race” discrimination actionable under the Act. Id.
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discriminated against if he was “subjected to intentional discrimination based
on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation
of his origin, or his religion.”48 The Court did not require that the class
identifier be physical or ethnic characteristics, like race,49 but rather
confirmed that discrimination on the basis of ancestry violates both the 1866
Act and the Equal Protection Clause.50
Since Hirabayashi, the Court has confirmed that both private and public
policies that discriminate on the basis of ancestry violate the 1866 Act and
the Equal Protection Clause, unless they are able to withstand strict
scrutiny.51 Following precedent, a judge will find that policies that
discriminate on the basis of ancestry are subject to strict scrutiny. In the
context of legacy preference policies, the open question will involve the scope
of the ancestry classification and whether discrimination on the basis of
family lineage, as opposed to ethnic lineage, is within the scope of the
ancestry classification. The following section explores this question.
2. Whether discrimination on the basis of family lineage is within the scope of the
ancestry classification.
The scope of the ancestry classification has not been fully resolved. A
judge could plausibly read the Supreme Court’s ancestry precedent as only
encompassing discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic groups.
However, some legal scholars have argued that the reasoning of the Court’s
ancestry precedent suggests that discrimination on the basis of family lineage
falls within the ancestry classification.52 Specifically, some legal scholars
argue that the Court’s decision in Oyama v. California53 “made clear that the
prohibited ‘ancestry’ distinctions include those based on individual family

48
49

50
51
52
53

Id. at 613.
Id. (“[A] distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for . . . protection.”). Thus, an identifier
based on family lineage, such as a listing in the Social Register or Burke’s Peerage & Gentry, should
suffice. In the case of discrimination against the children of non-alumni, the class is identified by
consulting the applicant’s answer to the family lineage question asked on the application form.
Id. at 613 & n.5 (noting that discrimination based on ancestry violates § 1981 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See supra Part I.A.
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 102–03.
See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (holding that certain provisions of the Alien
Land Laws cannot abridge the rights of citizens merely because of their ancestry).
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lineage–on the identity or status of one’s parents–in addition to those based
on racial or ethnic group.”54
The Court’s decision in Oyama can be plausibly read to include
discrimination on the basis of family lineage as included in the suspect
ancestry classification. In Oyama, the statute at issue prohibited illegal
immigrants, who were ineligible for American citizenship, from transferring
land.55 The father bought agricultural land for his son, Fred Oyama, who
was a minor and an American citizen.56 The statute prevented the father
from transferring land to his son, because he was an illegal immigrant and
ineligible for American citizenship.57
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause, because it discriminated against an American minor whose parents
could not be naturalized.58 Under the statute, an American minor whose
parents were either American citizens or eligible for naturalization would not
be barred from the ability to receive land.59 As the Court stated, “the father’s
deeds were visited on the sons.”60 This disparate treatment to minor citizens
whose parents could not be naturalized, deprived the son, Fred Oyama,
equal protection of the law.61
The discrimination against Fred Oyama has been described as being
based on “national origin,” but some legal scholars argue that the holding
should be read to prohibit a broader form of discrimination based on “family
lineage.”62 Those scholars argue that type of discrimination Fred Oyama
faced was not based on national origin, because his nation of origin was the
United States.63 The discrimination was not based on Fred Oyama’s nation
of origin, but rather, it was based on his father’s nation of origin. Therefore,
these scholars argue that the discrimination was based on family lineage–the
status or conduct of his parents.64

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 102–03.
Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635–36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 639 n.16.
Id. at 643, 646–47.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 641, 647.
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 103–04.
Id.
Id.

November 2019]

SCRUTINIZING LEGACY ADMISSIONS

325

In the same year as Oyama, the Court articulated the scope of the ancestry
classification to arguably cover family lineage in the context of education. In
Plyler v. Doe, the Court found that a Texas law, which denied free public
education to children who could not prove that they had been lawfully
admitted into the United States, was subject to heightened scrutiny.65 The
classification was applicable because “the children who are plaintiffs in these
cases ‘can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status,’”66 and,
“no child is responsible for his [or her] birth.”67 Although the children were
themselves unlawfully present in the country, denying a free education to
them “poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause:
the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to
advancement on the basis of individual merit.”68
The Court’s dicta in a variety of cases could also be instructive in
determining the scope of the ancestry classification. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,
Justice Stewart, in dissent, stated that the Equal Protection Clause “promised
to carry to its necessary conclusion a fundamental principle upon which this
Nation had been founded—that the law would honor no preference based
on lineage.”69 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice
Thurgood Marshall, in dissent, stated that “[s]tatus of birth, like the color of
65

66
67
68

69

457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (finding that a state law that required children to prove lawful
admission into the United States to receive free public education was subject to heightened
scrutiny).
Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)); see also id. at 223 (legislation
affected “a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status”).
Id. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
Id. at 221–22. In a concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), Justice Brennan
noted that “equality of citizenship is of the essence in our Republic,” Id. at 70, and that, “[t]he
American aversion to aristocracy developed long before the Fourteenth Amendment and is, of
course, reflected elsewhere in the Constitution.” Id. at 69 n.3 (citing the Nobility Clause). Rather
than paying homage to ancestry or lineage, the Constitution “requires attention to individual merit,
to individual need.” Id. at 70. In Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985), the
Court quoted Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Zobel for the proposition that, “the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of
citizenship based on length of residence. And the Equal Protection Clause would not tolerate such
distinctions.’” Id. at 623 n.14 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)). See generally Mark
G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1394 (1990) (“Arbitrariness lies in classifying persons in
accordance with their birthrights (slave status) or other characteristics (race) over which they have
little or no control; a reasonable classification takes into account their wills, the things they are able
to choose to do or not do within the limits of their capacities and the social order.”) (footnote
omitted).
448 U.S. 448, 531 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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one’s skin, is something which the individual cannot control, and should
generally be irrelevant in legislative considerations . . . . Hence,
discrimination on the basis of birth—particularly when it affects innocent
children—warrants special judicial consideration.”70 Justices Breyer, Souter,
and Ginsburg, writing for themselves, in Miller v. Albright, confirmed that
“[t]his Court, I assume, would use heightened scrutiny were it to review
discriminatory laws based upon ancestry, say, laws that denied voting rights
or educational opportunity based upon the religion, or the racial makeup, of
a parent or grandparent.”71 Given that a child need not have the same
religion as her parent or grandparent, Justice Breyer’s language could be
read to include discrimination on the basis of family lineage as eliciting strict
scrutiny.72
3. Legacy preference policies discriminate on the basis of family lineage.
If a judge finds that discrimination on the basis of family lineage is within
the scope of the suspect ancestry classification, then it is likely that legacy
preference policies would be subject to strict scrutiny.
Like the
discrimination in Oyama, the discrimination of legacy preference policies is
70

71

72

411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 476 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This Court, I assume, would use heightened scrutiny were it to review
discriminatory laws based upon ancestry, say, laws that denied voting rights or educational
opportunity based upon the religion, or the racial makeup, of a parent or grandparent.”); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (“That concept [race based classification] is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon
the individual and its rejection of disposition based on race or based on blood.”) (citations omitted);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[H]uman equality is closely associated with the proposition that differences in
color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons should
be treated.”). The dissenter in Korematsu v. United States had earlier made clear that the proscription
on discrimination based on “ancestry” is not confined to racial or ethnic groups. 323 U.S. 214, 243
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2432 (2018). Justice
Jackson concluded that Korematsu was entitled to be judged on his own merits rather than on who
his parents were or what they might have done. Id.
Miller, 523 U.S. at 476 (Breyer, J., dissenting). None of the other opinions of a badly fractured
Court reached this issue. Nor did any of the opinions in a subsequent case that addressed the same
statute. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
See also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 30 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that state tax
exemption for children of homeowner parents denies equal protection because it “establishes a
privilege of a medieval character” by “treat[ing] [families] differently solely because of their
different heritage”). The majority upheld the statute in Nordlinger because only the rational basis
test applies to State tax statutes, and review of exemptions to such statutes is especially deferential.
Id. at 11–12. Moreover, the plaintiff did not assert that the heredity discrimination required
heightened scrutiny. See id. at 10–11.
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based on the status and conduct of the applicant’s parents. An applicant
whose parents did not attend any university would be discriminated against
at all universities based on his or her parent’s status. Further, even if an
applicant’s parents did attend college in the United States, the applicant
would still be discriminated against at every other university to which they
apply if there is a legacy preference policy in place.
In the alternative, it is entirely possible that legacy preference policies
could be found unconstitutional even under the national origin test if the case
comes under certain facts. An applicant whose parents did not attend college
in the United States, because they were born in another part of the world,
would be discriminated against based on his or her parent’s nation of origin.
Because the applicant’s parents did not attend a school in the United States
due to their national origin, there would be no university that the applicant
would receive an admissions advantage at. Thus, it is likely that under the
right set of facts, a judge could find that legacy policies discriminate based on
ancestry, and accordingly, are subject to strict scrutiny.
B. The Race Classification
1. Policies that discriminate on the basis of race are subject to strict scrutiny.
Policies that discriminate on the basis of race are subject to strict
scrutiny.73 When a statute does not explicitly make racial distinctions, a
judge must find that the policy is motivated by a discriminatory purpose.74
Although it is without question that legacy policies were initially
implemented to purposefully discriminate.75 Today, it is unlikely that a judge
would find that legacy policies purposefully discriminate on the basis of race.

73

74

75

The Supreme Court held that all race-based classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990), which had briefly allowed the use of intermediate scrutiny to analyze the Equal
Protection implications of race-based classifications in the narrow category of affirmative-action
programs established by the Federal Government in the broadcasting field.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding that laws that have a racially discriminatory
effect but were not adopted to advance a racially discriminatory purpose are valid under the U.S.
Constitution).
See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
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However, legal scholars have argued that legacy policies have a disparate
racial impact on non-white university applicants.76
Additionally, the Court’s reasoning in its race discrimination
jurisprudence could be extended to encompass discrimination based on
birth-status. If a judge did find this to be the case, the race and ancestry
discrimination cases would be instructive in analyzing legacy preference
policies under strict scrutiny. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Regents
of University of California v. Bakke, held that race discrimination is subject to
strict scrutiny because the Equal Protection Clause protects “every person
regardless of his background,”77 and “a State’s distribution of benefits or
imposition of burdens [cannot] hinge[] on ancestry or the color of a person’s
skin.”78 Justice Brennan’s separate opinion agreed that, “human equality is
closely associated with the proposition that differences in color or creed, birth
or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons
should be treated.”79
Additionally, in Rice v. Cayetano80 the Court held that the State of Hawaii
violated the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on race-based voting qualifications
by limiting the franchise to persons with “native Hawaiian” ancestry. Racial
discrimination is unlawful in large part because it is a type of discrimination
based on ancestry or lineage:
One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is
that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities. An inquiry into
ancestral lines is not consistent with respect based on the unique personality

76
77

78
79

80

Steve D. Shadowen, Personal Dignity, Equal Opportunity, and the Elimination of Legacy Preferences, 21 CIV.
RTS. L.J. 31, 61 n.148 (2010).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) and Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938)). In his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan
wrote that race discrimination is unlawful because “[t]he humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id. at 360–61 (requiring
strict scrutiny when a State decision is based on “an immutable characteristic which its possessors
are powerless to escape or set aside”).
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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each of us possesses, a respect the Constitution itself secures in its concern
for persons and citizens.81

The Court’s language in both Bakke and Cayetano could be interpreted by
a judge to argue that racial discrimination based on birth-status is subject to
strict scrutiny. If this were the case, a judge then must determine whether
legacy preference policies had a discriminatory effect on non-white races
based on birth-status. An explanation of the history of legacy preferences
and the current racial makeup of legacy students is instructive in answering
this question.
2. Historically, legacy policies were founded on racial discrimination.
Legacy policies originated in the 1920s at the most prestigious East Coast
universities. During this era, many universities increased their selectivity due
to increasing enrollments following World War I.82 This era also coincided
with an increase in nationalism, which resulted in anti-immigrant and antiJewish sentiments.83 The East Coast universities were concerned about their
increased Jewish enrollments, and they addressed the concerns of overenrollment by implementing mechanisms—like legacy preference policies—
to exclude Jewish applicants.84
The anti-Jewish sentiment of these legacy preference policies was explicit
during this decade. Harvard’s President Lowell was determined to limit the

81

82

83
84

Id. at 517; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746
(2007) (quoting this passage from Rice); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531 & n.13 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause “set out to establish a society
that recognized no distinctions among white men on account of their birth” and “promised to carry
to its necessary conclusion a fundamental principle upon which this Nation had been founded—
that the law would honor no preference based on lineage.”).
See MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND
ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900–1970, at 154 (1979) (discussing the
relationship between anti-Jewish sentiment and admissions restrictions at Yale and, more generally,
other elite universities); see also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987)
(holding that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, plaintiffs cannot solely show the defendant perceived them
to be a separate race, but must in fact be one of the racial classifications Congress intended to
protect under the statute); DAN A. OREN, JOINING THE CLUB: A HISTORY OF JEWS AND YALE 40
(2d ed. 2000) (analyzing how restrictions on Jewish enrollment may be considered racial
discrimination, if Jews were considered a separate race at the time the policy was implemented).
SYNNOTT, supra note 82, at 154.
Id.; see also Kathryn Ladewski, Note, Preserving a Racial Hierarchy: A Legal Analysis of the Disparate Racial
Impact of Legacy Preferences in University Admissions, 108 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580 (2010) (describing the
ways East Coast universities developed mechanisms in the 1920s to exclude Jewish applicants).
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number of Jewish students, either through a quota or explicitly higher
academic standards for Jewish Students.85 In 1925, President Lowell
explained that the purpose of legacy policies was “to prevent a dangerous
increase in the proportion of Jews.”86 Although other prestigious universities
were not as explicit, Yale’s plan to address its increasing enrollment of Jewish
students resulted in the nation’s first legacy admissions preference in 1925.87
Soon after implementing this policy, Yale decreased its percentage of Jewish
students and doubled the percentage of legacy students.88
In the 1960s, legacy acceptance rates were further increased, potentially
as a tool to discriminate against Black applicants.89
[A]s pressure toward racial integration intensified, acceptance rates rapidly
increased for children of alumni—in some cases, to as much as three times
higher than that of the past. Given resistance on the part of historically
White institutions to enrolling Black students during the civil rights era,
legacy policies may have furnished an excuse to reject racial minorities
without resorting to the quotas that had been used exclude Jews and
Catholics earlier in the century.90

Although the nation’s first legacy preference policies were racially
motivated, universities today justify their legacy preferences based on
nondiscriminatory reasons, such as maintaining alumni donations.
However, legacy preference policies still have a racially discriminatory effect
that a judge could find is analogous to that of Yale and Harvard’s original,
intentionally discriminatory legacy policies. This racially discriminatory
effect is explored in the following sub-section.

85

86

87

88
89

90

See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION
AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 86–109 (2005) (describing the lengths these universities
went to exclude Jewish applicants); see also OREN, supra note 82, at 49–52.
See id.; see also ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING THE PLAYING
FIELD: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 83–84 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
2004) (discussing the introduction of legacy preferences at Dartmouth in 1922).
OREN, supra note 82 (explaining that the preference ensured that the “limitation on numbers shall
not operate to exclude any son of a Yale graduate who has satisfied all the requirements for
admission.”); FULLINWIDER, supra note 86, at 84.
See OREN, supra note 82, at 116.
Marybeth Gasman & Julie Vultaggio, Perspectives: A “Legacy” of Racial Injustice in American Higher
Education, DIVERSE ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 22, 2008, https://diverseeducation.com/
article/10519/.
Id.
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3. The racial impact of legacy preferences.
White students disproportionately benefit from legacy preferences.91 For
example, at Harvard, the new incoming class is about one-third legacy, and
of that third, approximately 98% are white.92 Legacy preferences at most
universities have been described by legal scholars as “near-perfect prox[ies]
for being white.”93
The disproportionate benefit of legacy preference for white applicants
not only grants a benefit on them, but also perpetuates this benefit onto
future white applicants. Legacy policies improve admissions prospects for
predominately white alumni children. This leads to their white children
receiving a benefit from these policies. Because legacy preferences benefit
children of alumni, “[t]he racial and ethnic composition of the pool of
potential legacy students necessarily resembles the composition of past
student generations.”94 Therefore, not only do legacy preference policies
disproportionately benefit white students today, these policies also perpetuate
this cycle of giving an admissions advantage to white children of alumni.
II. APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO LEGACY POLICIES AS
CLASSIFICATIONS BY PARENTAL STATUS
The Supreme Court also applies a middle-tier intermediate scrutiny to
discriminatory classifications that do not rise to the level of strict scrutiny.
Under intermediate scrutiny, a policy will be sustained if it involves an
important objective and the classification is substantially related to that
objective.95 Intermediate scrutiny applies to cases of potential discrimination

91

92
93
94
95

See id. (“Because legacy admits are typically wealthy, White, fourth-generation college students, they
offer little to colleges and universities in terms of racial and ethnic diversity. In fact, according to
multiple sources, over 90 percent of legacy admits are White Protestants. Thus, legacy admits
systematically reproduce a culture of racial and economic privilege.”).
Ginger O’Donnell, Challenging Legacy Admissions, INSIGHT INTO DIVERSITY (June 27, 2018),
https://www.insightintodiversity.com/challenging-legacy-admissions/.
Id.
Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The Racial Composition of the Legacy
Pool, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 346 (2004).
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”).
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on the basis of gender96 or illegitimacy.97 The intermediate scrutiny test has
been applied unpredictably, and some scholars believe that the result of
applying this test can depend on the values and perspectives of the judges
applying it.98
A judge could find that legacy admissions should be reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny because, as is the case with children born to unmarried
parents, “no child is responsible for his birth.”99 Thus, to penalize a child’s
ability to get into a school based on whether their parent was able to get in,
especially if that parent was unable to get in because of previous
discrimination on the basis of race or religion, would be unjust to the child
because they have no control over this status.100
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Court held that a state could
not lawfully prevent such children from recovering workers’ compensation
death benefits.101 Discrimination against children based on their parents’
status elicits heightened scrutiny because “legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing,” and “no child is
responsible for his birth.”102 The Equal Protection Clause “enable[s] us to
strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth.”103
Similarly, in Mathews v. Lucas104 the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
a federal statute that required out-of-wedlock children to meet additional
proof requirements in order to obtain survivor insurance benefits, because
the statute used “a characteristic determined by causes not within the control

96
97
98

99
100

101
102
103
104

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males
and females are ‘subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.’”).
Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny . . . has been applied to discriminatory
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”).
In Craig v. Boren, the Court invalidated a law that banned the sale of 3.2% beer to eighteen to twentyyear-old males while allowing purchase by females of the same age. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The
same test resulted in a decision in 1981 upholding a California law that allowed males, but not
females, to be charged with statutory rape. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
Taken together, the two cases suggest the unpredictability of the intermediate scrutiny test used by
the Court.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY
PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 201 (2010) (explaining how the demographics of the
alumni applicants will take several generations to change).
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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of the . . . [child], and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to
participate in and contribute to society.”105
Agreeing that heightened scrutiny was required, but disagreeing that the
statute survived such scrutiny, Justice Stevens dissented because the
government must be “especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of
birth.”106 He noted that the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution’s prohibition on titles of nobility “equally would prohibit the
United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth.”107
However, to be a quasi-suspect classification, the judge would have to
find that there was a history of discrimination against persons of that legal
status, however the judge defines it. A “badge of identification” is not
required, like that which makes obvious a person’s race or gender.108
III. APPLYING RATIONAL BASIS TO LEGACY POLICIES
If the legacy preference policy is found to not fall within the ancestry,
race, or parental status classifications, then it will be analyzed under rational
basis review. Rational basis scrutiny applies to all cases that do not receive
intermediate or strict scrutiny. Under rational basis scrutiny, a policy will be
sustained if it involves a legitimate government objective, and the
classification is reasonably related to achieving that objective.109 Courts have

105

106
107

108
109

Id. at 505; see also Trimple v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (explaining that heightened scrutiny
is required because out-of-wedlock children “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own
status”).
Mathews, 427 U.S. at 520 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 13 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that proscription on titles of
nobility prevents out-of-wedlock child from “being treated by her government as a second-class
person”). Discrimination against out-of-wedlock children has been subjected to heightened
scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, only because that status is often entangled with the State’s
interest in ensuring proof of paternity. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Reed v.
Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982).
Id.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (“[S]cheme must still be
examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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found that rational basis review applies to cases of age110 and disability111
discrimination.
The rational basis test is very deferential and nearly all policies analyzed
under this standard are found to be constitutional. In FCC v. Beach,112 the
Court went so far as to say that economic regulations satisfy the equal
protection requirement if “there is any conceivable” fact pattern that could
provide a rational basis for the classification. Justice Stevens, concurring,
objected to the Court’s test, arguing that it is “tantamount to no review at
all.”113
The only federal court that has addressed what level of review applies to
legacy preferences held that rational basis review was the applicable test.114
In Rosenstock v. Board of Governors of University of North Carolina, Judge Hiram
Ward of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina applied the rational basis test, because the Supreme Court had
found that the right to a university education was not a fundamental interest,
and he found that children of alumni are not a suspect criteria.115 The issue
in Rosenstock was whether the university’s policy of preferential treatment of
out-of-state applicants who are the sons or daughters of alumni constitute a
denial of plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the laws. Applying rational
review, Judge Ward held that the University of North Carolina’s legacy
preference policy survived rational review because “defendants showed that
alumni provide monetary support for the University and that out-of-state
alumni contribute close to one-half of the total given.”116 The court further
said, “[t]o grant children of this latter group a preference then is a reasonable
basis and is not constitutionally defective.”117
Decided in 1976, Rosenstock is non-binding, non-persuasive, and will likely
not be followed. First, this case is not binding on any court, because it was
110

111

112
113
114
115
116
117

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (applying the rational basis test to age
discrimination because there is not a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” based on age and
“old age does not define a discrete and insular minority” because all persons experience all ages if
they live out their normal lifespans).
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (holding that if special accommodations are to
be required for the disabled, then they must come from positive law, not from the Fourteenth
Amendment).
FCC v. Beach, 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993) (emphasis added).
Id. at 323.
Rosenstock v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 423 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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decided by a federal district court. Second, it is not persuasive, because it
does not provide any reasoning that will be instructive to future courts. Judge
Ward concludes that strict scrutiny does not apply to legacy policies in a mere
five sentences, but in doing so, the court never explains its reasoning for why
various classifications do not apply. Additionally, the facts in Rosenstock were
not ideal for a challenge to legacy policies. The plaintiff was a white student,
whose ancestors were from America, and she likely did not have the
credentials for the university she applied to. Finally, this case will likely not
be followed, because it was decided over forty years ago. In the last four
decades, the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has drastically
changed, including the clear articulation of the three standards of review.
For these reasons, Rosenstock will likely not factor into a court’s decision on
what standard of review to apply.
Potentially more important is Justice Clarence Thomas’s partial dissent
in Grutter v. Bollinger.118 In his partial dissent to this landmark affirmative
action case, Justice Thomas stated that the Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause did not prohibit “unseemly legacy preferences,” because they did not
directly involve race.119 He further stated that “legacy preferences can stand
under the Constitution.”120 In a footnote, Justice Thomas further weighed
in on legacy preferences and said, “[w]ere this court to have the courage to
forbid the use of racial discrimination in admissions legacy preferences (and
similar practices) might quickly become less popular—a possibility not lost, I
am certain, on the elites (both individual and institutional) supporting the
Law School in this case.”121
Like Judge Ward’s decision in Rosenstock, Justice Thomas’s partial dissent
is neither binding nor persuasive for a judge determining which standard of
review to analyze a legacy policy under. Justice Thomas’s partial dissent
does, however, shed light on his perspective of this issue. As the only
Supreme Court justice to weigh in on this question, rational basis review very
well might be the standard of review that will be applied. Thus, it is likely
that Justice Thomas would agree with the Judge Ward’s opinion, and he
would likewise apply rational review because legacy preferences do not
directly involve race.
118
119
120
121

539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 369; see also Adam Liptak, A Hereditary Perk the Founding Fathers Failed to Anticipate, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/us/15bar.html.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369.
Id. at 368 n.10.
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IV. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
After determining what level of scrutiny a challenged legacy policy would
be evaluated under, a judge would then weigh the governmental interest
furthered by the legacy preference policies. This section discusses three
governmental interest that a judge would use to evaluate whether the legacy
policy survives review. First, there is a compelling governmental interest in
maintaining student-body diversity at prestigious universities. In the Court’s
affirmative action jurisprudence, the issue of student-body diversity was a
compelling enough interest to sustain some amount of race-based affirmative
action. Evidence strongly supports the contention that legacy policies harm
the racial diversity of universities’ student bodies.122
The universities may argue that legacy preferences survive strict scrutiny,
because legacy status is only one of numerous factors in an individualized
review of each application, just as was approved in Grutter.123 This argument
fails, because it bypasses the first step of identifying the university’s interest.
In Grutter, the preference in favor of otherwise under-represented racial
minorities served the school’s interest in achieving student body diversity.124
Grutter asserts that “nothing less than the ‘nation’s future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”125 Accordingly, “attaining a diverse
student body is at the heart of the [university’s] proper institutional
mission.”126 Student-body diversity also promotes good citizenship and
stabilizes society by ensuring that “all members of our heterogenous society
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational
institutions that provide this training.”127
122
123

124
125
126
127

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
See generally Id. In Grutter, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious
admissions policy. Id. The Court held that the policy was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, that the school had a compelling interest in obtaining a diverse student body,
and that the means of achieving that goal were appropriately narrow because race was only one
factor in a holistic evaluation of each application. Id.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 332; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 834
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing strict scrutiny is necessary when government uses race “to
decide who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and
which are in short supply”).

November 2019]

SCRUTINIZING LEGACY ADMISSIONS

337

Second, those in favor of legacy preference policies will argue, as they did
in Rosenstock, that universities have an interest in raising money. They will
argue that legacy preference policies increase alumni donations. This
argument is often assumed to be correct; however, a statistical analysis of
alumni contributions at top schools shows that there is no evidence of
causation between an increase in alumni donations and legacy preference
policies.128
Those defending these polices argue that they increase university
revenue.129 There are two problems with this argument. First, there has
never been an empirical analysis that proves a causation between legacy
preferences and increased revenue. Second, profiting from discrimination is
unlawful.130
Universities will not be able to meet their burden to establish causation
between legacy preferences and increased university revenue.131 A recent
study performed an analysis of the effects of legacy preferences on private
giving and found no statistically significant relationship.132 The study
surveyed the top seventy-five national universities and top seventy-five liberal
arts colleges as ranked in the 2007 edition of U.S. News & World Report.133
Of the 150 schools, the study was able to confirm that 102 grant legacy
preference and seventeen do not; of the latter, eight stopped granting legacy
preferences within the past fifteen years.134 The database included alumni
giving rates from 1992 to 2006.135 The data showed no statistically
significant correlation between legacy preferences and alumni giving.136
Further, of the eight universities that have recently terminated legacy
preferences, seven experienced an increase in donations.137
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Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 129–32.
Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The Racial Composition of the Legacy
Pool, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 330 (2004) (arguing the purpose of preferences is “to keep . . .
alumni happy—and donating”).
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 125–26.
See, e.g., Kathrin Lassila, Why Yale Favors its Own, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2004,
http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2004_11/q_a.html.
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 2, at 129–32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, even if a defendant-university is able to show a causation between
donations and legacy preferences. Profiting from discrimination is not a
legitimate government interest. The law cannot recognize the receipt of
revenue from the discrimination’s beneficiaries—here, alumni students—as
a legitimate interest.138 For example, the Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas could not have justified its racially segregated schools by asserting
that the white parents would have been more amenable to tax increases if
the schools remained all white.139 Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe, the State of Texas
tried to justify the denial of a free education to undocumented children by
pointing to the need to preserve scarce funds for the education of lawful
residents.140 The Supreme Court found that Texas’s justification was not a
lawful government interest.141
Additionally, legacy preference policies are not narrowly tailored to the
goal of increasing revenue. The universities’ purported interest here is simply
in raising revenue, which can easily be done without discriminating based on
lineage. They can obtain additional government funding, use their
endowments, increase private fundraising efforts, and cut administrative
expenses.142
CONCLUSION
Legacy preferences in college admissions infringe fundamental American
values. Preferring the applications of alumni children gives them a
substantial benefit based not on merit, but on the identity, status, and
accomplishments of their parents. Although legacy preference policies
infringe these fundamental values, it is unclear whether they are
constitutional. If this case came before a judge it would be an issue of first
impression. Because of the nature of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence,
the constitutionality of a legacy preference policy would depend on what level
138
139
140
141

142

Id. at 125–26.
Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982) (holding that denying undocumented residents’ children
access to public education).
Id. (“[A] concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification
used in allocating those resources.”). To assert that denial of a benefit to the disfavored class will
save resources is simply to “justify . . . classification with a concise expression of an intention to
discriminate.” Id.; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (holding the saving of
welfare costs by invidious discrimination of aliens is unconstitutional).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 n.25.
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of review a judge decides to analyze the policy under. The judge’s decision
will turn greatly on the facts. The impact of what standard of review to apply
could be the difference between the continued discrimination against nonrich, non-white individuals from the nation’s top institutions, and the end to
this meritless system that has discriminated against those most vulnerable
since its racist founding.
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